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Hearing and Believing:
What Shall We Tell the
Administrative Agencies?
Professor Merrill examines various proposals for evidential reform in administrative adjudication and discusses
them in the context of two specific formulations: the
"convincing evidence" rule of the original Model State
Administrative Procedure Act and the proposed revision
of the Model Act, which would impose a "qualified nonjuiy-trial" rule of admissibility. Professor Merrill proceeds from the premise that the purpose of evidentiary
rules is to gain a maximum of useful information for the
agency with a minimum of unfairness to the parties. He
points out that this goal can be achieved either by qualitative screening of the evidence at the hearing level or by
quantitative analysis of the entire record upon judicial
review. The author concludes that the latter approach is
more likely to serve the ends of efficiency and justice;
therefore, he opposes the proposed revision of the Model
Act.

Maurice H. Merrill*
Here then the contest begins between the attorneys of the parties; not
to elicit the truth, but to shut out the truth by the rejection of testimony by the aid of the arbitrary rules of Courts, and the equally
arbitrary and unintelligible law of evidence, which in nine cases out
of ten leads to injustice and wrong. Now I ask in all humility, why
not let all the testimony without restriction come before the jury, and
leave them to judge of the testimony, the facts, and the justice or
equity of the case, and under the advisement of the judge, also of the
law?'
The Anglo-Saxon law of evidence may be compared to a soundly rooted-and once symmetrical tree which in the course of years has become lop-sided, full of dry rot and so entangled with vines and creep*Research Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma.

1. Speech of Delegate Jaques, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1844, pp. 459-60

NEW JERSEY
(1942).
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but it is impossible to tell which
ers that it not only obscures the light
2
are branches and which are parasites.

It was very justly observed by a great judge that all questions upon
the rules of evidence are of vast importance to all orders and degrees
of men: our lives, our liberty, and our property are all concerned in
the support of these rules, which have been matured by the wisdom of
from their antiquity and the good sense in
ages, and are now revered
3
which they are founded.

These varying appraisals of the rules devised and applied by
the courts to govern the reception and use of evidential material
reflect positions each having many adherents among both laymen
and lawyers. There are those who would scrap all the rules, letting
the trier of fact listen to everything, in the hope that thereby he
can get the clearest picture. There are those who believe that some
guides are necessary in the interests alike of efficiency and of

truth, but who are convinced that many improvements need to be
made in our existent practices. Still others consider that the current rules embody as near an approach to perfection as can be
made.
The expansion of the use of administrative adjudication in the
past century has brought these views to bear upon issues affecting
the reception and use of evidence by the tribunals engaged in that
adjudication. The relative freedom of rule makers to seek out the
bases for policy4 renders the problem less acute in that respect. "
But for the agencies engaged in adjudicating particular disputes
it is essential to have ground rules to be applied to the search for
the determinative facts.
What should be the objects of these ground rules? Basically,
they should seek to obtain for the agency the information necessary for the application of the statute it is administering to the
particular dispute. They should be framed and administered with
a view to securing all relevant information, with regard to fairness to the parties, and with care to avoid confusion to the agency.
It is essential to distinguish between two major problems: (I)
What evidence may an agency receive and consider? (2) How
much evidence will suffice to support an administrative finding of
fact? Customarily, courts and writers have been accustomed to
deal with both problems under the rubric of "substantial evi2. TRAIN, YANKEE LAWYER 349 (1944).
3. Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290, 295 (1813) (Marshall,
C.J.).
4. See the discussion in 2 DAvIs, ADMINISTRATivE LAW § 15.03 (1958).
5. "When making rules . . . [an agency] may ascertain in any manner

it sees fit what rules should be made and it may make such rules without
the hearing of any evidence or without regard to the evidence heard."
H. F. Wilcox Oil & Gas Co. v. State, 162 Okla. 89, 91, 19 P.2d 347, 350
(1933) (Andrews, J.).
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dence." I suggest, however, that we should separate them, in aid
both of clarity in analysis and of clear delineation of the policy
considerations involved in each.7 To borrow from the language of
chemistry, the first demands qualitative analysis of the evidence,
while the second involves quantitative analysis.
With respect to the question of admissibility, the views of the
courts have varied widely. Some judges have considered that the
rules applicable in suits at common law, "matured by the wisdom
of the ages,"8 necessarily must be followed in administrative adjudications,9 even to the point of requiring reversal simply because evidence-incompetent by the common law was received, regardless of indication of harm to the complaining party."0 Other
courts, probably more numerous, permit the administrators to admit and to consider evidence which would not be allowed by the
common-law rules to go before a jury,' subject only to the qualification that it should be "convincin'
or "the kind of evidence
on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in serious
affairs." 3 Still others apply what Dean Wigmore called the "pseudo-liberal rule"'" that there is no error in admitting evidence outside the common-law categories of competence 5 and that such
evidence may be considered in arriving at a decision, 6 but that,
6. Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S.

142, 147 (1937). See Stason, "Substantial Evidence" in Administrative Lau,

89 U. PA. L.REv. 1026 (1941).
7.Compare Greenleaf's statement of the point: "Questions respecting
the competency and admissibility of evidence, are entirely distinct from
those which respect its sufficiency or effect
DENCE 4-5 (lth ed. 1863).

...

1 GREENLEAr, EviI."

8. See Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290 (1813).
9. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v.Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 326 I11.
625,
158 N.E. 376 (1927); Spiegel's House Furnishing Co. v.Industrial Comm'n,
288 Ill. 422, 123 N.E. 606 (1919); Chiordi v.Jernigan, 46 N.M. 396,
129 P.2d 640 (1942).
10. In re Trustees of Westminster, 108 Vt. 352, 187 At. 519 (1936).
11. Public Utilities Comm'n V. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Bockman
v. Arkansas State Medical Bd., 229 Ark. 143, 313 S.W.2d 826 (1958);
Bennett's Restaurant v. Industrial Comm'n, 127 Colo. 271, 256 P.2d 891
(1953); Indianapolis & So. Motor Express v. Public Service Comm'n, 232
Ind. 377, 112 N.E.2d 864 (1953); Western Union Tel. Co. v.Dodge County, 80 Neb.18, 113 N.W.805 (1907).
12. LAM v.NLRB, 110 F.2d 29, 35 (D.C.Cir. 1939).
13. NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 873 (2d Cir. 1938).
Compare with this the description given by our first great American scholar on evidence, for what he termed "satisfactory" or "sufficient" evidence
-that is, that it should be such as "to satisfy the mind and conscience of a
common man; and so to convince him, that he would venture to act upon
that conviction, in matters of the highest concern and importance to his
own interests." 1 GE EENLEAF, EVIDENCE 4 (11th ed. 1863).
14. See 1WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 83 (3d ed. 1940).
15. North Alabama Motor Express v. Rookis, 244 Ala. 137, 12 So. 2d
183 (1943).
16. Froman v.Banquet Barbecue, Inc., 284 Mich. 44, 278 N.W. 758
-
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standing alone and unaided by a "residuum of legal evidence,"17

it may not be used to sustain the finding of an essential fact."
Despite Wigmore's strictures, the residuum rule does tend to liberalize the reception and the use of evidence by administrative agencies. But the whimsical differences in result arising from the fortuitous variances in the testimony available from case to case do
not commend the rule as an aid to the consistent administration
of justice.'0
Inevitably, the unsatisfactory variance in the case law concerning the subject led to essays at providing statutory guides. These
have been varied2" and they are not at all satisfactory in operation.2 The federal Administrative Procedure Act states a broadly
catholic rule: "Any oral or documentary evidence may be received

... "22 However, this is followed by a requirement that decisions must be "supported by and in accordance with the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence."' Coupled with the provision
for judicial setting aside of orders "unsupported by substantial
evidence, 2 4 it seems to open the door to the wide exercise of administrative discretion. But there remains some uncertainty as to
whether it does perchance prescribe the residuum rule.25
In the realm of state procedural reform, the original Model
State Administrative Procedure Act prescribed the "convincing
evidence" rule for admissibility. 26 While there has been a sugges(1938); Maley v. Thomasville Furniture Co., 214 N.C. 589, 200 S.E. 438
(1939); Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial Comm'n, 102 Utah 492, 132 P.2d
376 (1942). But cf. Mailman v. Record Foundry & Mach. Co., 118 Me.
172, 106 At. 606 (1919).
17. Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 440, 113 N.E.
507, 509 (1916).
18. Swim v. Central Iowa Fuel Co., 204 Iowa 546, 215 N.W. 603
(1927); Jackson v. Curtiss-Wright Airplane Co., 334 Mo. 805, 68 S.W.2d
715 (1933); Andricsak v. National Fireproofing Corp., 3 N.J. 466, 70 A.2d
750 (1950); Glass v. State Board of Public Roads, 44 R.I. 54, 115
At. 244 (1921).
19. See COOPER, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE COURTS 192
(1951).
20. For a partial collection, see MERRILL, CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw 320-22 (1954).
21. Cf. 2 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 14.06 (1958).
22. 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006(c) (1958).
23. 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006(c) (1958).
24. 60 Stat. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1958).
25. See discussion in DAvis, op. cit. supra note 21, § 14.11.
26. The term "convincing evidence" is not contained in the Model Act,
but has been used as a convenient analogue of the more cumbersome statutory language. The rule as stated in the Model Act is as follows: "Agencies may admit and give probative effect to evidence which possesses probative value commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct
of their affairs." MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATrVE PROCEDURE ACT § 9(1).
The "convincing evidence" terminology seems to have originated with
Mr. Justice Rutledge. See National Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 110 F.2d
29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1939), affd, 311 U.S. 72 (1940).

1961]

EVIDENTIAL REFORM

tion that the provision for judicial setting aside of findings "unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in view
of the entire record as submitted"' commands observance of the
residuum rule,2" I am unable to follow the reasoning which leads
to that result. The term "competent," as applied to evidence,
means no more than that the evidence is fit to be admitted and to
receive consideration by the trier of fact in the determination of
the case which is before him.29 Since the Model Act already has
stated that "convincing evidence" may be admitted and may be
given probative effect, it must be that such evidence is "competent"
within the meaning of the standard for judicial review. What might
be "competent" for a jury to hear and to consider has no relevance whatever with respect to this problem.
Another proposal for reform put forward in recent years is that
the standard for admissibility be set as the equivalent of that prevailing in the courts for the trial of non-jury cases.3" The last version of a proposed revision of the Model Act contained a combination of the two rules.3 Thus there are crystallizing two major
proposals for the phrasing of rules to govern the reception and use
of evidence by the agencies. Both agree that there should be some
departure from the jury-trial rules. Which solution is the better?
With respect to the standard of "rules . . . as applied in [nonjury] . . . cases,"32 the first thing that occurs to me is that, in
most jurisdictions, this is no standard at all. The modern authorities on evidence tell us that they know of no distinction between
the rules governing jury cases and those governing non-jury
cases." The Uniform Rules of Evidence, proposed by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, were de27. MODEL STATE ADMINIsTRAivE PROCEDURE ACT § 12(7) (e). (Emphasis added.)
28. See DAvIS, op. cit. supra note 21, § 14.06.

29. United States v. DeLucia, 256 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1958).

30. See 2 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 21, § 14.04; Harris, Administrative
Practice and Procedure: Comparative State Legislation, 6 OKLA. L. REV.
29, 47 (1953); Hazard, The Oregon Administrative Procedure Act: Status

and Prospects, 39 ORE. L. REv. 97, 104 (1960); Note, 1 WILL. J. 272,
283-84 (1960).
31.
So far as practicable, the rules of evidence as applied in [non-jury]
civil cases in the [District] courts of this State shall be followed.
However, when necessary to ascertain facts affecting the substantial

rights of the parties to the proceedings (except where precluded by
statute) evidence not admissible under such rules may be admitted if
it is of a type commonly accorded probative value by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs.
MODEL STATE ADmNSTRATivE PROCEDURE ACT § 10(i) (Revision, Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1960).
32. See note 31 supra.
33. See McColmICK, EVIDmENCE 137 (1954); TRAcY, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 7 (1952); 1 WiGMOR,
EVIDENCE 15 (3d ed.
1940).
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signed to be applicable "in every proceeding, both criminal and
civil, conducted by or under the supervision of a court, in which
evidence is produced."3 Evidently the able lawyers who participated in the drafting of these rules did not consider that there was,
or should be, any difference between judges sitting with juries and
judges sitting without juries in this respect. It follows that the result of prescribing that the rules of evidence applicable in non-jury
cases be used in administrative hearings is, in effect, to prescribe
the use of jury-trial rules by the agencies.
It is true, as we know, that there are ways in which the trial
judges are permitted to escape from the more serious handicaps
of the jury-trial bonds in their handling of evidence in cases tried
to them. Thus there is the pious fiction that the judge, having admitted and listened to prohibited testimony or having read incompetent documents, has thrown them out of his mind when he arrives at the time for decision.35 Some courts have applied a very
tenuous variant of the residuum rule, to the effect that, even if
the trial judge considered the incompetent evidence, his decision
will be sustained if "the remaining evidence is without conflict
and is sufficient to support the judgment."3 Other cases seem to
speak in terms substantially equivalent to the residuum rule, affirming if upon disregarding the incompetent evidence there remains sufficient proof to sustain the judgment.3 There are judicial statements broadly asserting a wider discretion in the trial
court if there is no jury,3 s even verging to the extreme of seeming
to say that there are no restrictions enforcible on appeal.39 But
one encounters more conservative attitudes also. Sometimes the
affirmance is based on the fact that the record does not indicate
reliance by the judge below upon the incompetent testimony, pregnant with the inference that reversal would be the fate of the judgment if such reliance did appear.4" Courts which have proclaimed
34.

UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE §

2.

35. Kellner v. Whaley, 148 Neb. 259, 27 N.W.2d 183 (1947); Green v.
Henderson, 66 Nev. 314, 208 P.2d 1058 (1949); State ex rel. Halvorson
v. Simpson, 78 N.D. 440, 49 N.W.2d 790 (1951); First State Bank v. MlcKiddy, 206 Okla. 57, 240 P.2d 1103 (1952); Farley v. Farley, 136 W.Va.
598, 68 S.E.2d 353 (1951).

36. Bessemer Theatres v. City of Bessemer, 261 Ala. 632, 636, 75 So.
2d 651, 655 (1954).
37. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. Van Denburgh, 76 Ariz. 1, 257
P.2d 856 (1953); Bennett v. Barber, 46 Del. 132, 79 A.2d 363 (1951).
38. Rosenblatt v. Clements, 314 Ky. 450, 236 S.W.2d 261 (1951); PumpIt, Inc. v. Alexander, 230 Minn. 564, 42 N.W.2d 337 (1950); Board of
Managers v. City of Wilmington, 237 N.C. 179, 74 S.E.2d 749 (1953).
39. "Complaint is made of certain rulings on the admission of testimony.
These are not available, since the cause was tried without the intervention
of a jury." Bell v. Walker, 54 Neb. 222, 226, 74 N.W. 617, 619 (1898).
40. City of Stuttgart v. Elms, 220 Ark. 722, 249 S.W.2d 829 (1952).
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that wide discretion is bestowed upon the trial judge have stated
also that it'is error for him to act upon the incompetent evidence
that he admits. 4 And there is authority to the effect that, if the
evidence is conflicting, the appellate court will reverse on the presumption that the incompetent evidence was considered4 2 In this
light, the trial judge is deemed no better at appraising evidential
values than is the most untrained and inexperienced juror.
No comprehensive study of the treatment of the rules of evidence has been attempted by this writer. The sampling is sufficient, however, to establish that there is no consistent or generally
followed rule for the amelioration of the rigors of the jury-trial
code of evidence in matters tried to the courts. Still less should we
expect to find a general lenience in the review of administrative
agencies, often manned by laymen. If the statute says "follow the
rules applicable to the courts," how many judges will say, with respect to such tribunals, what Mr. Justice Helm of Kentucky said of
Judge William H. Field:
The court overruled the objection, saying that he would apply the rules

of evidence in"
his own mind .... The finding of the court in this
case must be regarded as a verdict of a properly instructed jury.43

Would it, then, be wise to saddle the administrators with the
common-law rules? All the authorities seem to agree that they often
are technical and obstructive of justice even in the courts4" and
that their exclusion of many matters relevant and probative is due
solely to doubt that the casual and inexperienced members of the
jury will be able to make the proper relative evaluation of relevance and weight. 41 Judges, professionally experienced in receiving and weighing evidence and learned in the law, safely may be
permitted wide discretion.4 6 Administrators may be lacking in le41.
Blitz,
42.
43.

Reid v. Johnston, 241 N.C. 201, 85 S.E.2d 114 (1954); Menefee v.
181 Ore. 100, 179 P.2d 550 (1947).
In re Conners Estate, 240 Iowa 479, 36 N.W.2d 833 (1949).
Rosenblatt v. Clements, 314 Ky. 450, 453, 236 S.W.2d 261, 262

(1951).

44. Thayer, *Observations on the Law of Evidence, 13 MxcH. L. Rev.
355 passim (1915); Thelen, The Railroad Comnrission as a Model for JudicialReform, 2 MmiN. L. Rev. 479, 486 (1918).
45. See Baldwin, The Artificiality of Our Law of Evidence, 21 YALE L.J.,

105 (1917); Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13 MICx.
L. REV. 302, 314 (1915).
46.
In Scotland, and most of the Continental States, the Judges determine
upon the facts in dispute as well as upon the law; and they think there
is no danger in their listening to evidence of hearsay, because when
they come to consider of their judgment on the merits of the case,

they can trust themselves entirely to disregard the hearsay evidence,

or to give. it any little weight which it may seem to. deserve. But in
England, where the jury are the sole judges of the fact, hearsay.'evi-
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gal lore, but their experience in evaluation will be sharpened by
speciality in subject. With adequate opportunity for judicial correction of egregious error on their part, they should be allowed to
receive and appraise the valuable assistance frequently available

from substantial hearsay,"

affidavits,4" reliable letters,49 opinion

surveys, 5° secondary copies of documents, 5 newspaper accounts, 2 standard reference works,5 3 financial statements,"4 summaries,5" and so on down the list of sources of information upon
which serious men frequently arrive at important decisions de-

spite the fact that no judge would think of letting it go to a jury.
There is the additional consideration that if the agency is acting

through laymen, it will be faced with an impossible task in applying the cabala of the lawyers.5" We shall have reversal after
reversal on grounds which have no relationship to the substantial
rights of parties before the tribunals.
No doubt it will be urged that the objections which I have raised are met by the qualifications contained in the proposed revision of the Model Act:
So far as practicable [non-jury-trial rules of evidence shall be followed] ....

[W]hen necessary to ascertain facts affecting the substan-

tial rights of the parties to the proceedings, except where precluded by
statute, evidence not admissible under such rules may be admitted if
it is of a type commonly accorded probative
value by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. 57

With all respect, I must differ. In the first place, it amounts to no
more than what Judge Joseph Hutcheson so neatly and so sensi-

bly calls "bewordling."

s

Either we set up a new standard or we

dence is properly excluded, because no man can tell what effect it
might have upon their minds.
Berkeley's Case, 4 Camp. 401, 415, 171 Eng. Rep. 128, 135 (1811) (Mansfield, C.J.).
47. Altschuller v. Bressler, 289 N.Y. 463, 46 N.E.2d 886 (1943).
48. Bockman v. Arkansas State Medical Bd., 229 Ark. 143, 313
S.W.2d 826 (1958).
49. The Washington, 19 F. Supp. 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
50. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
51. Schuylkill Ry. v. Public Service Comm'n, 268 Pa. 430, 112 Atl. 5
(1920).
52. United States ex rel. Gegiow v. Uhl, 215 Fed. 573 (2d Cir. 1914).
53. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Dodge County, 80 Neb. 18, 113
N.W. 805 (1907).
54. Indianapolis & So. Motor Express v. Public Service Comm'n, 232
Ind. 377, 112 N.E.2d 864 (1953).
55. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 223 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir.
1955).
56. Bockman v. Arkansas State Medical Bd., 229 Ark. 143, 313 S.W.2d

826 (1958).

57. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 10(1) (Revision,
Tent. Draft No. 3, 1960).

58. See Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the
"Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 280 (1929).
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don't. It doesn't make sense to tell the administrators that they
are to follow the courtroom rules of evidence and then say to
them, "if these rules stand in the way of justice, use the rules commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of
their affairs." If we really mean that this last admonishment is the
standard we want applied when we are in search of justice, why
not announce it as the general standard for admissibility, as is the
case with the present draft of the Model Act? Presumably, justice
always is our objective. The existent "convincing evidence" standard will exclude nothing admissible under courtroom standards,
and it will admit all that ought to be admitted to achieve justice.
Why, then, introduce a two-step form of statement that really
adds nothing?
In the second place, this form of statement, with its shifting and
turning language, is ideally suited to confuse our lay administrators. Indeed, it well could confuse a Philadelphia lawyer. We must
remember that even the lawyers who sit on agency benches all
too frequently are substantially below the traditionally Philadelphian standard of acumen. These hearing officers and agency
members, then, are apt to have serious difficulties in determining
what they are called upon to accept or to reject. The decisions under the "convincing evidence" standard of admissibility do afford
a reasonably adequate concept of the sort of evidence that may
be admitted and considered. The alternative phraseology which
has been proposed blurs the image decidedly. It will be most difficult for the presiding officers to decide what ruling to make if
the reception of evidence is challenged. As a result, the conduct
of hearings will be greatly complicated.
Finally, the task of judicial review at best will be deranged. At
worst it may revert to the strait-jacketing of the administrative
process in vogue a few decades ago. How is the reviewing court
to judge whether it was or was not necessary to relax the courtroom rules for the purpose of ascertaining facts "affecting the substantial rights of the parties to the proceedings"? What are substantial rights, under the statute administered by the particular
agency and within the context of the contfoversy sub judice? What
is affectation, within the meaning of this provision? And in determining whether "substantial rights of the parties" have been
affected, if the definition of "party" ,as proposed in the first section of the draft is applied to the interpretation of this provision
as to evidence, what is the role of the public interest in the efficient
administration of a statutory standard, as an element in determining the need to depart from courtroom rules in order to achieve
justice? I should think that this would be an important factor in
arriving at such a determination. However, the definition of "party"

534
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does not seem broad enough to include representation of the public interest by the agency. " 'Party' means," we are told, "each
person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party, to any court
or agency proceeding." 9 This does not seem to embrace the public as an entity, and it is by no means certain that the agency as a
party, is proprietor of the public interest. At least, there are extant decisions in related areas of the law which lend themselves to
the support of the view that the "substantial rights" of the agency
would not be affected by an exclusion which merely handicapped
the achievement of the public policy of the statute under administration."0 For this reason, I fear that many judges would b e led
to deny to the agency the authority to depart from courtroom
rules of evidence in the interest of efficient achievement of statutory objectives. These uncertain problems appear at first blush
to lurk in the proposal for relegating to an alternative and subordinate role the "convincing evidence" rule for admissibility.
Closer study, particularly by ingenious counsel defending the interests of their clients, probably will reveal many other bases for
litigation. Then, too, there is the unfortunate invitation to hunt
for obscure phrases in other sections of the enacted law, extended
by the parenthetical "except where precluded by statute."'" This
will present knotty problems in many states. The proposed revision is unfortunate from another aspect, as well. It destroys the
uniformity as to practice which should be the desideratum of a
general procedural statute. The far better choice would be to enact a rule of general applicability.
So much for the alternative phrasing of the test for admissibility in its least troublesome aspects. If we look at its worst possibilities, the picture becomes dark indeed. In the hands of a judge
who considers that the common-law rules constitute the "universally recognized criteria of truth, ' 62 or that the hearsay rule in
every one of its manifestations "is not to be considered as one of
the technical rules of evidence," 63 this statute would be a vehicle
for overturning every relaxation of the common law of evidence.
59.

MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEDURE ACT §

1(3) (Revision,

Tent. Draft No. 3, 1960).
60. Miles v. McKinney, 174 Md. 551, 199 Atl. 540 (1938); A. DiCillo
& Sons v. Chester Zoning Board of Appeals, 158 Ohio St. 302, 109 N.E.2d
8 (1952); Board of Review v. .Coddling, 199 Okla. 281, 185 P.2d 702
(1947); Department of Labor & Industry v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 362 Pa. 342, 67 A.2d 114 (1949).
61.

MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT §

Tent. Draft No. 3, 1960).

10(1) (Revision,

62. See Sherman, Evidence in Proof under Workmen's Compensation
Laws, 68 U. PA. L. REv. 203,214 (1920).

63. Englebretson v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 170 Cal. 793, 799, 151

Pac. 421, 423 (1915).
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Thus would be restored a complete judicial supersession of the
administrative judgment whenever it was desired. Each departure.
from the norm-so far from being "necessary" to sustain substantial rights-would be a clear derogation from those rights,
warranting reversal. Since the corrective action usually would be in
the hands of nisi prius judges, there is reason to apprehend that
it would not be administered as judiciously as the best appellate
opinions might indicate should be the rule.
These defects do not make a conclusive case against the imposition of the courtroom rules of evidence upon administrative
agencies, whether outright or in the unfortunate alternative guise
Currently proposed. If there were no other way of affording safeguards against administrative aberration, it might well be that we
should accept the proposed solution. Agencies do some weird and
wonderful things in the name of freedom from technicality, as the
reports clearly show.64 However, the imposition of an unduly high
qualitative standard for the admissibility of evidence in administrative proceedings is not the effective way to safeguard the individual from administrative whim or prejudice.
The really efficacious method of protection comes at the stage
of quantitative analysis of the evidence in judicial review of the
proceedings. This safeguard is afforded by the requirement that the
administrative findings of essential fact, to be upheld, must be supported by "substantial evidence in view of the entire record," as
the present Model Act phrases it,65 or by providing for setting the
order aside, on judicial review, if it is "clearly erroneous, in view
of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole
record," as the new tentative draft proposes. 6 Under either form,
we will have superseded the type of review that looks simply to
see whether the "evidence in the record tending to support the order entered,"6 " standing alone meets the test of substantiality. In
its stead we will have a review in which the court, without substituting its judgment for that of the agency on reasonably disputable propositions, does examine the entire record to see whether
the evidence against the agency's finding so clearly overwhelms
that which supports the finding that the latter becomes arbitrary,
64. Bascom v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 25 Cal. App. 2d 334, 77 P.2d
305 (1938); Wadell v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 136 Conn. 1, 68 A.2d
152 (1949); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 178
Okla. 260, 62 P.2d 1220 (1936); Tulsa St. Ry. Co. v. Shoemaker, 106
Okla. 99, 233 Pac. 182 (1925).
65. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 12(7) (e).
66. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 14(7) (c) (Revision, Tent. Draft No. 3,1960).
67. See Pannell v. Farmers' Union Co-op. Gin Ass'n, 192 Okla. 652,
654, 138 P.2d 817, 819 (1943).
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whimsical, or "clearly erroneous. ' 6 This type of review provision
gives the courts full power to correct arbitrary applications of the
evidence which the agencies are permitted to admit. At the same
time, it does not open the door to uncertainties and to fanciful and
technical' reversals of agency guesses as to when it was or was not
necessary to relax the court room rules "in order to ascertain facts
affecting the substantial rights of the parties." It precludes reversals based solely on agency error in disregarding jury-trial rules
of admissibility. It reduces the likelihood of that substitution of
the judicial view on policy for the views of the legislature and its
administrative agency which has been the cause of much criticism
of the working of judicial review over administrative determinations.
For these reasons, I suggest that it will be well to leave unchanged the statements of the present Model State Administrative
Procedure Act concerning the admissibility of evidence. The judicial review provisions will permit the courts to give all needed relief against whimsical action based on figmental evidence.

68. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1935); Wood v.
Wagner Elec. Corp., 355 Mo. 670, 197 S.W.2d 647 (1946); Motor Transport Co. v. Public Service Comm'n. 263 Wis. 31, 56 N.W.2d 548 (1953).

